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:The life of operations research and management science ("OR/MS")
groups both in U-. S.- business and in :Federal civ.il.ian agencies, is char-
acterized by continuing, i.f attenuating, voiati. i-ty. (9,18,20). Advocates
of OR/i1S (here broadly defined so as to include systems analysis, advanced
multivariate analysis, end the quantitative analysis. and evaluation aspects
of PPBS) have'been concerned with..improving ,its success in organizational
ccntexts.' Among their frequent recommendations toward this end is that
the-OR/t4S staff must be given, or should somehow obtain, "Top Management
Support."-(10) In fact, this exhortation is common.among the missionaries
of new managerb'- technologies.. (7,21). One may wonder if busy:top managers
'have any time to devote to the support of in-house i.nnovative functions,.
'especially those which are based on sophisticated and esoteric technologies
like operations research. An examination of several writings.about high'
level management jobs yields suggestive, but conflicting hypotheses about
the possibility of "Top Management Suport.;(TMS)..' . .
Donald Stone proposes several.central problems of top.executive jobs.
Fi'rst, the top manager. needs -to- "'maximize his influence throughout his .or-
genization,",as distinct from reliance on formal authority, second ,he must -
.-overcome divisivenries in his organization; third, he must develop ia -body
of commonly shared "ideas'" in order to faci.litate attention to the long-run.
(16) To these Burns and Stalker might add the .interpretation of the-tech-.
nical and market situation. and the adaptation .of both -the working. organization,
and. individual.comitments to it, in appropriate ways.-(2, p. 209) If these
are the central problems of top managers,. then it appears that they will
have little use for OR/MS.. -Corson and-Paul examine :the-jobs of high-level
Federal civil -servants, both program managers and staff personnel,'.. They. .
-emphasize, through several capsule descriptions of the jobs of actual. people,
that the Federal executive is .at. the hub, not the apex, of a political process,
He'promotes the achievement of objectives and effects.-changes through nego-
'tiating, persuading, and developing a- local consensus, at. all ·times balancing
the diverse interests of legislators, interest groups, subordinates, superiors,
and peers. (5, ch. 2) There is no mention in these descriptions that program
'managers might use-analytical aids .to -decision making;- rather, the process
is described.as political and interpersonal-. ..Other writers emphasize the'
pervasiveness of external-relations not only in government (16) but also
..in:hospitals (8,'pp. 84-98) and-in (Swedish) business..(3) The descriptions
given of external relations activities do not suggest that OR/MS is relevant.
On the other hand, when time budgets.have been developed for.top
management jobs, planning emerges as primary.; Stieglitz. finds that 275 top
corporation managers both in the U,S. -and. abroad overwhelmingly' feel that
-planning is their most important act-i-vity. and that they devote the- largest
fraction of-their time to it. '(15) 'Corson finds-the same for University
presidents.. (4) Planning involves the elaboration-of and choice. among
alternatives, tasks for which its -advocates claim OR/MS is appropriate.
If top-managers are very, busy, then they may. not'have any extra time to
devote to OR/MS even. if their duties, such as-planning, would'predi.spose them
in that direction. Stieglitz finds that the 275 corporation managers he
·surveyed average between 50 and 60 hours a week of work, for example, a figure
also .found by Sune Carlson with a much smaller sample of Swedish managing
.1; . . .. .'. I .·~·'''·~~-:· · . . '
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2directors. (15, p, 24; 3, p. 63) Corson and Paul find that among Federal
program managers the work week is' slightly lower, about 49 hours, and Stieglitz
does; find that corporation top managers,.whatever their work week, manage to
take fair.ly lengthy vacations.:(l5, p, 25) Time-budget data suggests, then,
:.that top: managers may wel.l have room in their schedules for attention to a new
'.:OR/MS staff. Some contradictory inferences may be drawn from Carlson's finding
that top managers have almost no uninterrupted time. His'sample averaged less
than 10 minutes without a telephone call and several of his respondents saved
serious reading and thinking for home. (3, Ch. 4.)
-..:::.'At any rate, OR/MS is only one of several staff activities reporting
'toor -interacting with :a'top manager, Stone argues that an executive must rely
on his staff and that often by the time an issue gets to the executive the options
.are foreclosed, Before he can make changes in a staff's recommendations, another
issue arises to capture his attention. Consequently, a top manager may be forced
either to accept inferior staff reports, as Stone suggests,'or, in the case of
a new staff function in which his confidence is;-initially and-understandably
::lcw, the manager may have to ignore its reports; (16) If the manager accepts
-inferior reports from a new OR/MS staff he may find himself in trouble and
wallowtthe -OR/MS staff to develop a bad reputation. Seybold's study of
personnel reports in large corporations suggests that Stoner s analysis of the
--relations between top managers and staff groups'' is 'accurate, She finds top
-managers subject to an incredible variety of reports from'this function alone.
(il; 12) . '-" ' ' ' 
Several factors mentioned as being specifi c'to government organizations
are noteworthy here. Stone suggests that:government executives lack legal
'authority commensurate with thei'r responsibi-li'ti.es and that they are subject to
a-.high level: of external influence. (17). He 'feels also that they are constrained
by "rigiditles in procedures attendent upon managing according to law and'exec-
utive regulation." (16) Since these comments were made, it seems to me that there
has been a convergence in public and private management situations such that
-these.kinds of differences are disappearing. 'Their impact:on the support of
OR/MS is not immediately clear, in part because'the factors'tend to be contra-
*dictory (for example, there is both not enough and too much law). Stanley has
documented the generally short -terms of Federal political' executives and his
figures for tenure may be compared with those given by Stieglitz. (14, pp.
151 - 153; 15) While.not noted by Stanley, short tenure is often assumed to
induce a lack of attention to change or an inability to follow through with
major change. In either case, top management support for a new OR/MS
activity.would be more difficult in government than in business for this
reason. Yet Stanley's data also show that the agencies with the most rapid
turnover are Defense, State, and Commerce, hardly uniform in their use of OR/MS.
We are left here, as throughout the discussion of top management jobs, with
no clear anticipatory hypotheses about top management support of' OR/MS'. Given
the unexplicated nature:of the concept, "Top Management-Support," this should
not be surprising. .. - '' -
It is not sufficient to ask simply either managers or OR/MS analysts
:how strong is the TMS they are, respectively, giving or .receiving. Bean has
this statement thoroughly documented. (1) TMS is actually a rather complex
concept involving several things: resource allocation, defense of the OR/MS
staff, conflict resolution, and resource mobilization;- understanding of OR/MS
techniques and their applications; willingness to use or to help others use
OR/MS recommendations; and, skill at pacing, guiding, and protecting the
developing OR/MS staff. Vigorous and/or coercive support for the staff
* Many field respondents have made this observation.
at a time when it is not yet .ready to produce workable recommendations may
jeopardize the organizational careers of both the staff and its supportive
manager, New staffs.can have too many resources and too many conlicts resolved
.:-for them. It may on occasion be.-functional for a manager to decline to use
a recommendation if -the staff has. not performed well in presenting it or. if the
approaches taken in the study-have been overly.complex and'esoteric...
-. In other words,:TMS has many components and the kind of support that
.helps the OR/MS staff develop toward a healthy .self-sufficiency may involve
"non-support!' for tactical reasons.. The notion that OR/MS staffs must always
_:be given resources, always listened to, always helped in conflicts is.a reflec-
tion of a-rather simplistic,. missionary commitment to.OR/MS and an abdication
of managerial responsibility for the development in-subordinates of the ability
to retain healthy autonomy in a situation of mutual and multiple dependence.
· .. " , .. { . ..  .... .; .. -, . ., . -. . .. : ,,
.If. we. are.to understand Top Management Support and its relation to
.the. development of an OR/MS staff, we first need a better,,more discriminating
understanding of TMS, itself.-. TMS must. be disaggregated into more workable
-dimensions which can, in turn, be used-in.testable propositions.' A.preliminary
-disaggregation.of TMS is into attitudes, -acti.ons, and communications. We want
to know, how do:top managers feel about OR/MS.and their OR/MS .staffs in particu-
lar? What actions might a top- manager.take regarding an OR/MS staff.-- is it
likely that a'manager will,. in fact, intervene in a conflict or. help the OR/MS
staff hire a particular analyst?' 'What are.the patterns of communication between
the manager and the staff -- who initiates the communications, are they written
or oral,· formal- or informal, etc-.? Before one cah'interp-ret specific.top'manage-
ment-actions as."support," one-needs to know what kinds of actions are likely
to be forthcoming, It will do no good to test an hypothesis relating a specific
action of a top manager to the success of the OR/MS staff. if: in the field it is
learned that .the action almost never occurs. Consequently. the first objective
- of the fieldwork was to:-Adiscover and to dimension the relations between top
-managers and OR/MS1'activities.- Secondly, it was hoped that there might be some
insight:gained into the relations among the three aspects of top management
support, attitudes, actions, and communications.... A flinal objective.was to
attempt some preliminary examination of the relations between some of.these top
management-variables and the "success"- of.-the OR/MS staffs.
..The research. investigation was directed at "dimensioning" the concept of
-Top: Management Support. ..In this first.analysis of the data, attention has been
directed at the three questions just .given. -The analysis..is abeginning and not
an end and in,later papers the data will be reanalyzed in an attempt to do a
.more thorough job of answering these questions .. ; -..
- h p -, r : -.... ,: :- . a v' -: ..- cl:
General Characteristics of the Empirical Study .
. . i.- ., . . : , - .'. ::. ..- .a. .: .
-The study involved interviews with 16 top managers. in 15 federal ;
civilian agencies. (In one agency both the present. and former ,Deputy director
were interviewed.) ;.,e directos'of- 16 agencies were contacted by letters;-
the letters were followed by telephone.calls to arrange specific appointments.
In most .cases, the executive had. already. instructed his secretary to arrange
an. appointment at a convenient time with him or with a high-ranking subordinate
he had:already designated. I was unable to complete an interview in only
one of the 16 agencies, and I do not' feel that I was being evaded there,
-- 
, ' , .: .. : . ,, !
" -""" ..;--4- .
Rather, the agency was involved in' Congressional 'hearings, the top management
. was new to its jobs,. and many top positions'were vacant at the time. My
;': .irequest for an interview, therefcre, came at.an inopportune time. ,Of the 16
top managers in.terviewed,. 11'were. either agency directors or deputy directors.
'The other five were assistant.directors..for either administration or for
.planning.* All but two of.'the sixteen.had direct line authority over the
'OR/MS.staff (s) in their agency. In each of'the fifteen agencies there was
one or more'OR/MS staffs currently operating. In all agencies we had.per-
'.formed interviews with members of the most important OR/-MS staff and often
-;'had contacts with other extant'OR/MS'staffs as well. 'These' interviewed had
'" been .going on, in some cases, for over three years, and all the agencies
' were in our sample'of 35 agencies which has been the basis 'for.much other
research. :The interviews with OR/MS analysts served to supplement the infor-
mation obtained in the top management interviews.**
The interviews were conducted in August' of 1969; 'in o'ne case, the rer,-
spondent was interrupted early In the interview by pressing business and asked
· if.he could complete the interview alone and return it by mail.. .As the '
questionaire had not been des'igned with the instructions' necessary for self--
'!:'administrat.io , I made'a.few modifications in the instrument before sending
*'-it to him; however, none of-these were in'matters of substance.
* ' ~': ' The Interview instrument included mainly two kinds of questions, fixed
response and "critical event" probes.. (6) The following'kinds of information
were obtained: data on past experiences with OR/MS; attitudes towards OR/MS
:--: and the contribution it could make to various kinds of decisions, both in
; general and as it was'practiced by the OR/MS staffs in the agency: written
:'and verbal. reporting relationships between the OR/MS staff and the manager,
including probes on the specific consequences of these reports for the manager's
- behavior toward.the.OR/MS activity; presentations by the OR/MS staff to the
.manager'or which the respondent attended, and the' manager's evaluation of,
.those experiences; evaluations of the importance,,.rxesponsiveness, and organ-
'-"' izational position of.the OR/MS staff; respondent's preferred style of manage-
ment for the .OR/MS staff; respondent's interventi ons in':conflicts'.involving
the OR/MS staff;'existence of rules governing size and/or scope of OR/MS
-projects requiring top management approval; various specific actions which
the manager may or may not have ever taken with respect to the OR/MS 'staff,
' -such as approving reimbursement for conference attendence or assistance in
hiring'a desired operations -researcher, etc. Much of the data is difficult
to reduce to'a form amenable to tabular presentation and has as .its main
'value to the expansion of the author's understanding as a prelude to 'further
investigation .In a later paper, he will; however, use this data as a basis
for a more narrative discussion of TMS.
Both the respondents and their agencies were- characterized by great
diversity. This matter will be discussed at length .later in a section devoted
to 'problems' of external validity".' ' ':'- ' --' 
* In federal agencies there is, generally,' a director who is politically
.-;:!' -"'appointed, a deputy director, less often politically appointed, who is''
':- the "No. 2 man", and several staff and line assistant directors who are'
:'.: i ' -usually career civil servants. By agency,'lImean major line components
of the Executive Departments, and independent offices. Examples are: The
Office.of Education .[but;not its Bureau of Higher Education)'or the-General
Services Administration (but not its Federal Supply Service).
-** By this I do not mean that I had any reason todoubt the truthfulness of the
top managers; rather, the alternative data was available. Though the two sets
of data allowed improved understanding of each other, there were no important
contradictions.
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Presentation of the Data
Only some of the findings from the study will be discussed in this
.- --paper. These findings can-be organized under three questions. -
How Close are top manacers to OR/M1S groups?'
-:': u' Figure I p-resents. data from several questionnaire items relevant to
-......-- this question.. Arranged in the rows are the' codings of. each of the 16
managers. on theseven questions whose general subjects provide the column
headings, The last column is the sum-. of-the number'of plus's in each row
(for each manager). The questionnaire items represented in the columns are
of two types, measures of the closeness of the top manager to the OR/MS staff
and measures of the degree to which the manager uses OR/MS recommendations.
The first five columns are of the former type, and the last two are of the
latter, A "++" indicates a high score, a "+" indicates a medium score, and
,-.:.....a-" ·indicates a low score for the respondent on the particular questionnaire
item. These items are more than simple questions: all except the items for
the fifth column involve "critical event".o'estioning, and'the item repre-
sented in the fifth column is a list of'26'actions which the manager could
have taken toward the OR/MS staff.
:- ....... Ficure 1'. CLOSENESS'AND. USE
":"'65. . ' . 9c. : 21. " 7 : ' :9.
.... 'Formal.' Formal- Verbal Written Action Formal Other
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* ;:'Two approaches can be taken to-exkplicating the data in Figure 1.
First what do the 1''s", etc., mean in reality? Let us ·take'Mr E. as an
example,.'' Mr. E.' is the Assistant Director of a large Washington agency.
Under him is a PPBS 'staff wh.ich;·doe's hlgh'h rec'rded analytical work. .Mr. E.
(for column one, FormalRegular Reports) receives biweekly, from both the
OR/MS staff and from line division directors .formal wr.itten reports which
regularly ontain 4 to"5 different types of i nforation about the OR/MS staff.
He claims toread "most"' :(rather than "some" or "all") of these reports, and
he originated all of them.. Others receiving a "1+-" in this column reported
similar levels-of activity'. A "+". indicates that the manager receives reports
less frequently, perhaps monthly, with oinly I or 2 kinds of information',
and fromi fewer organizational units. A "-" indicates little or no relationship
O/ through formal written reports ,
Mr. E. also receives occasional progress reports from his OR/MS staff
on specific projects, but these are not his majtor source of information about
the staff. Other, receiving '++'s",,receive Informal written reports like
Mr. E. receives formal ones, and some people receive almost .none of these
("-"). In the third column, Mr. E. receives verbal reports about the OR/MS
staff biweekly or more often from the line di-vision directors; these'reports
have influenced him favorably toward the present staff. Others may have a
more structured system of verbal briefings on a weekly or mnore frequent basis
involving the OR/MS staff and other organizational units ('4+"), and some
managers use this channel little If at all (-"). Mr. E. receives all the
Written Project Reports of the OR/MS staff and reads only "some" rather than
"most" or "all". He, therefore, n gets a "-"on this'col'umn; a '" would
require him to read "most" and a 4+" would require him to reado"all". Of
the 26 items on the Action List, Mr. E. has taken 7. On this column, the
data organized itself rather neatly into three categories, and the middle
range encompasses Mr. E. tThe three groupings' were 0 - 2; 5 - 10; and II+.
These five columns can be combined to make a wcloseness" score based
on the .number of "+'s" the respondent receives in them. The questionnaire
Items for these columns all index the amount of communications activity between
the manager and the OR/MS staff. Further on in the discussion when a "close-
ness" score Is used, however, itwill be composed of only the first four columns,
The correlation between the score based on four and the score based on 5
columns is nearly perfect.
f
'~- " -' , .m7-
The last two columns refer to'ques'tionnaire items indexing the
respondents use of OR/MS. In the next to the last column, scores are assigned
for the influence of fbrm-al' presen.tations on the manager's decision making
or on the decision making of other top managers in groups of which the'
respondent is a part. Mr. E. receives such decision-oriented presentations
about twice a month on the average; the last two'were judged beneficial to
both the agency and to the respondent himself, and the'OR/MS recommendations
were adopted in part on both occasions. A "+" would. indicate less frequent
presentations or presentations with similar frequency but somewhat less
effect,..or possibly a'bit less on both counts. The last column, "other
decision influence" refers to occasions when the OR/MS staff has influenced
decisions without making formal presentations.. The coding here is-similar
to that for the.previous column, and Mr. E. could recall no recent-occasions
for this item. Mr. E's total score of "+!s'' equals 11, placing him with 4
'other respondents. '' 
The second way to get a feel for the meaning of the +'s and -is Is
to consider how much time.per week they imply.. Making guesses about how
long a presentation takes or how long it takes to read a report, I have arrived
...atwhat' I hope are "ball park"' time'estimates 'to associate with the 'summary
.numbers in the last column. They are as follows: a summary score of 11
is equivalent to an average of about 4 hours a week directly devoted to the
OR/MS staff by the top manager. A score of 7 is roughly equivalent to 2
hours of time. A score of two or less is roughly equivalent to zero. These
are, in my opinibn,-conservative estimates-. Thus, 5 of the.16 managers are
spending practically no time on this activty.. Of the latter 5, all are
in one or more of three categories: very new to the job-; organizationally
distant from the OR/MS activity; out of the line of command above the activity.
'"For'example, one agency'head interviewed had only been on the job for six
weeks; and, thus, had not had the time to establish'the kinds of relation-
ships with the OR/MS group which this questionnaire was designed to discover;
at the same time, the OR/MS staff in his agency was 4 levels beneath him
in the organizational hierarchy. In another agency, I interviewed the
assistant director for research and the OR/MS was under the assistant director
for administration. These-five individuals will create problems in the
data discussed later also, but the sample is-small enough to preclude their
elimination.
Top manaqers' attitudes
Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 give the results of some questionnaire
items about the specific OR/MS group in the respondent's .agency. Where the
totals are greater than 16 it is because the respondent has given differential
'answers about different OR/MS activities in his agency, However, in forming
scales and indices only the responses oriented. toward the most important
group in the agency were used.
The charts show that the respondents felt that the OR/MS activities
were, in general, important and responsive and that the groups might be
expanded in size. The top managers' offer favorable evaluations of the OR/MS
staffs. The items which are presented in figure 2, the bottom of figure 3,
and figure 4 have been combined to form an "index of specific attitudes",
an index of attitudes toward the specific OR/MS staff in the respondent's
agency. ^Each Of the three items yielded trichotomous ordinal data, and the
index was composed by assigning to these ordinal categories a "0', "1', or
'-'2" and then summing for the respondent across all three questions. The
''index of specific attitudes" will be used below.
-8-
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Figure.5 '-presenhts the results of some questions about OR/MS in general.
Again, the responses are generally favorable; in fact these responses are
more favorable than were 'those just presented, .These items yield an "index
of general atti.tudes" t..toward. the role .of OR/MS."i'n the respondent's agency,
and the index is composed. in the same ma'ner as .the one just discussed.
-,..Figure 5.:.General Attitudes 
; ~~~~...:,. .:-,,I
i:. v --. ·: :, .....· -. ... :- agree -. : :- disagree
: .. ..- - ........ : .' .- i strongly agree' disagree strongly
. -] .: ;-.:., ': ,r OR/MS cannot make signi . ---
ficant improvements in the. 1 ;' .- '.....-:3'-:- 12
efficiency of this agency's'
operations. i
OR/MS can make significant i.-.
contributions to the deci- 9 .7
· t t   .!. I..... , O. ....  ... ......... . .....................
sions I -make. 
OR/MS can help this agency
more fully achieve its .5 :. .
performance objectives 
~. . ~- .. . · -.: 
.:..:. ... .The "use index", a measure of the frequency with which the respondent
uses either individually or as a participant in a group decision the outputs
of the OR/MS staff, is composed of the sum of the plus's in the last two
.. columns of Figure I for that respondent.. The "closeness index", a measure
of.the.amount of communication and frequency of contact between the OR/MS
group and the responding top manager, is composed in a.similar manner from
.. the first four columns in Figure 1, as: has been discussed above: (supra , pg.6).
. Conseguences of attitudes and orientations.' -----
. Four indices have now been described: "closeness index", "use index",
"index of specific attitudes", and "index of general attitudes". We:shall
now look at -the relations among these indices. . .
The statistical technique chosen.for relating the"indices- is Spearman's
Rank Correlation Coefficient, rS. It was chosen because of the nature of
the data, particularly because of the availability of a formula that incor-
porated a correction for ties. (13) . :. :-
Figure 6 shows the relation between the "closeness index" and both
the "index of general attitudes" and the "index of specific attitudes".
There Is an almost significant (p- .06) relationship* between closeness
and general attitudes; perhaps closeness occasions respect for the potential
* The author is cognizant of formal requirements for the use of signifance
tests and uses these tests here for illustrative purposes rather than for
proof.
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:.;: of-OR/MS, and respect for the potential occasions closeness as well. On the
:;.::, other- hand, there is. lit:le, *though still positive, relation between close--
.
ness and specific.attit.udes., I.n- other words,:a manager who is close to his.
,OR/MS staff is more likely to-have a high: regard for OR/MS in general than
for his OR/MS staff, There are several possible reasons for this finding
that are consistent with the author's knowledge of the specific situations.
First, some respondents are organizationally distant from high quality OR/MS
staffs. Yet they have a high regard for these staffs and for OR/MS in gen-
eral. Consequently, on a scatter diagram these resppndents would.appear
........... a. t'te extremes of the negative diagonal and have a distorting effect on
,the expected relationship. Also, several respondents are actively and
* ,:cltosel:y involved in attempting to improve OR/MS staffs, and'this, again,
' pushes. the relations, particularly that-:between closeness and specific atti-
tudes away from the normally expected direction.
Figure 6. WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN "CLOSENESS"
AND TOP MANAGERS' "ATTITUDES TOWARD OR/MS?"
General attitudes: rS = .40 (weak relation, p = .06)
Specific attitudes: rS .30 (no relation)
·. ., . -- -. ...
More surprising are the relationships shown in Figure 7. There appears
::-.--, only,a very weak positive relationship between the use of' OR/MS and attitudes
i:,~ itowards it.- The..rS s- here are' both small. 'Aga in, with 'reference to''specific
.attitudes, there were some managers who were new to their agency or distant
-. .from OR/MS groups, or both,. and in any of these cases they still had a high
. regard for the groups. Severa.l. managers were regular users 'of OR/MS :staffs
:;:,-.whilch they had a low opini-on of as OR/MS staffs, but which they found per-
-sonally useful; other managers remained skeptical about OR/MS even if they
used their OR/MS staff regularly. In one case, an agency head was, when
interviewed, severely critical of OR/MS even though he had started, protected,
built, and used a widely respected'OR/MS activity as his personal staff.
'--'e ra- -t'Li-,- --- re.-uyges-ted. First, -at-t-i-tudes -anu actons-re not related
;- necessarily in the superficially expected ways. Second, some managers are
willing to use staffs which are not producing professional work' 'in ways
:;-:c:,,-::- -expected by the manager. A manager is willing to take' inferior products
if;they are better than what he already has-available. Third,' respected
OR/MS staffs need -not work for top managers. Contrary to the usual argument,
an OR/MS staff may prosper outside of the protection of top managers.-
, - * ' 3, . ' ,..;..-., .; .
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Figure 7. WHAT IS'THE. RELAT.ION BETWEEN "USE OF OR/hMS"iAND
TOP MANAGERS' "ATTITUDES TOWARD OR/MS?" - '
';' ' -" -'': General attitudes: rS ,-.29 (no relation). -;:
Specific attitudes: rs " .'9 (no relation)
These me arguments areevident in Fiure 8. Here, the closeness
·.... i.· :,
These s'ame arguments are evident 'in Figure 8. Here, the closeness
..-~and use. indices -are ·related to my own rankings of the quality of the OR/MS
groups each respondent dealt with. These rankings are developed from the
,Program file of over'200..interviews, evaluations of knowledgeable Washington
observers, and documents collected at the field sites. The criteria.
. employed- in the rankings include the impact of the group on the agency, the
level of Or/MS technology employed by thee group', and .the organizational
complexity of. its projects. In general,; the results are.the same as indicated
' on' Figure 7 except here I have used· my own evaluations of the OR/MS groups
r,'rather than 'the respondent's evaluations:* The same possible' explanation
':''as before holds here,' too. One additional explanation can be suggested.
irFrom examination of individual 'case.histories: or OR/MS groups it appears that
,'a consequence of closeness to top managers -for an OR/MS group may be the
- decline in the group's professionalism. The technical sophistication of
the OR/MS work may decline and large scale projects may be neglected, both
in favor of work which might be called "fire fighting". This work may be
equally stimulating and i'mportant as it wi'll involve the criti.ca.l,:.unpro-
grammed crises of top- management; and, the analyti-cal.mind of a management
scientist may have much to.contribute to these problems. However,the staff
is then.not doing OR/MS, and my rankings are based on:evaluations of the staffs
..as OR/MS staffs. ..The suggestion that use of and closeness to an OR/MS staff
by top management may lead to the."dep.rofess.ionalizing" of the..OR/MS function is
not easily inferred from. the writings of those who believe that top manage-
ment support is essential. to the success of;the OR/MS function. In essence,
"what. is being said here is that the data suggest that there can be "too much
o..f...a, good thing." ............................
Figure 8. WHAT IS THE RELATION BETIEEN.."USE OF OR/MS
BY -TOP i^,-AGERoS-" OR "itS -.e -ES-S -OF TOP
MANAGERS TO OR/MS" AND RANKINGS OF THE
:*..' i-..:': v ','' ':' '-OR/MS GROUPS? . .....
.-. , i . .-- ·~ .: .- .
Use of. OR/MS:.. rS .26.(no .;relation)
, ' ' i t., ;-:,. ' ..-. - .. .'"; ;., '. :!
'
.
;
i -{-i"' ¢. U Closeness to OR/MS: r =.20 (no relation) ::
"'-toward a more objective and intersubjective ranking. (20) 'This data'
is still coming in and was not used here. No assumption is made here
that the application of OR/MS is naturally "easier" in some types of
agencies.
-i i2-
The closeness and use .indices themselves are strongly related
(figure '9) 'implying-that i.f. one .i.s using an OR/MS' staff, one must become
close to it in the sense that "closeness'! is used here. Also,. the high cor-
relation implies' the reciprical"relationship, that. if one is close to the
QO/MS staff,'.one .is .ikely. to be using it'.
Figure 9. WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN "CLOSENESS -.
" ' OF TOP' MANAGERS TO OR/MS" AND "USE OF
OR/MS BY TOP MANAGERS?"
,, . .. . ., .. . ... . : . , . ... ~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~: . .
-..--: . -· · Use -- closeness
.
s. rs .'81 (very strong relat'ions,
P <C"01) 
'.',. - - ;::-. .........
. .,. ..Figure 1Orelates the general and specific attitudes to my rank
.-orderings of the OR/MS staffs. 'if these rankings are accurate','the data
:'.,.S uggests that top managers in government 'are able to distinguish quality
·.in OR/MS groups and that these same managers do not allow their general
;,evaluations of OR/MS to be dominated by their immediate experiences.with it.
Confirming this interpretation of figu-re 10 is the fact that the correlation
:'(rS) between the indices-of general and specific attitudes is +.08, or
.effectively no relation..at all. '' ' .
.Figure 10. WHAT IS :THE RELATION BETWEEN "ATTITUDES TOWARD.
. - .. OR/MS"- AND THE RANKINGS OF THE OR/MS .'GROUPS?
: -..General attitudes: rs. =.29 (no relation) 
. 'Specific attitudes: rS - .43 :(strong relation,p 5)
' . .: . - Conclusions:
All the correlations are summarized : in Figure ll. Several general
conclusions can be drawn. First, it is apparent that OR/MS is very relevant
to many of the top managers interviewed for this study.' .Although there have
been extensive writings in which it is argued that this cannot be so (18),
the empirical evidence contradicts these. If 'OR/MS has yet to impinge in a
major and direct way on the most important and broad problems of domestic
policy, it-has in.its.very short life in government begun to play a role in
decisions which are important to-the agency directors who are making them.
'- .-And;-we should remember, their perception of what the significant decisions
are may well be. more accurate than a similar perception:based on. the daily
newspapers . . . . ... . .
.! . ..
' . ./ :. . . ..
: , - , ," . .i
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Figure 11: Summary
..... .. *EELA : ... .'... . : . :
i; _ .. ·.·' _i jI' . . _ GEN ERA L.AND
., .,.,.. . . .. ;., :.. .:: : .:.SPECIFIC ; .
*;; .> - ! .r ATTITUDES ' 
almost..no ..... some (weak) :.
,' .,' -' . : ' ,. : rel.at on relation l tio'n.-. 
~ .: . -. .,
: .. USE:AND. '.. o -. .:RANKINGS - ..
. .: CLOSENESS . ---relatio 
-
' OF GROUP. 
·
. -
· .. . .
.'": . Second, top management attitudes and top management actions are not
.-related in the most obvious ways. Favorable attitudes are not- necessarily
.related to high levels of use, and unfavorable attitudes are likewise not
:.necessarily related to .low levels of use.'. Rather.,. l-suspect (and'the data
needs to be.re-analyzed with some deviant.cases removed) that if.the-managers
who were new to the job when interviewed., out of: l.ine responsibili ty. for the
OR/MS staff,. or organizational.ly distant from the staff are removed from the.
sample, the remaining 11 managers will all-evidence-a consistantly strong
degree of closeness and use regardless of their attitudes. If this is so,
it reinforces my first conclusion.
Third, "Top management support" has been shown, I hope, to be a
complex concept which needs much further explication. My position is that it
ought to be discarded completely and more directly measureable phenomena
used in its place for the near future.
Fourth, the consequences to top management's use of and closeness
to an OR/MS group need not be the success of the group as a professional,
innovation-producing, research-oriented unit. This, of all conclusions,
is least apparent directly from the top management interviews; when these
interviews are combined with those done in the corresponding OR/MS staffs,
the conclusion seems hard to evade, however.
Several things may be inferred from this analysis and proposed for
further research'. One is that, after discussing the general problems with
other members of the research program, it appears possible that government
top managers are more at ease in dealing with professionals than their coun-
terparts in business. This should not be too debatable at the outset, for
so many government agencies are dominated by professionals (such as Public
Health Service, Geological Survey, Agricultural Research Service, and many
others). It may also be that government top managers are less demanding
of OR/MS staffs than their business counterparts have been. Perhaps the
problems which are forced upon the government executive are, in fact, less
amenable to quantification, even though, as will be argued below, the total
package of problems facing an executive in public life may not be much dif-
ferent than those faced by the private executive, (The differences appear
in which ones get delegated).
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External Validity
What confi dence can one have that thiese' findings and 'conclus ions
are really applicable to a world wider than that of 16 federal executives?
Admittedly, the sample is both/small and definitely non-random. Two things
may be said in its' favor,t'hen One'i's"that thesa sma'lsmple encompasses
a lot of diversity. The respondents are young and old; career bureaucrats
and new appointees; Ph.D. scientist, line management specialists, lawyers,
economists; etc. A wider variety of types would be hard to design inten-
tionally. The agencies are the same way. Some were brand new, others dated
to the 18th century; some were among the largest, others among the smallest;
their missions varied from research to grant-giving to law enforcement to
paper processing to, essentially, business administration; etc. So both the
men and their agencies encompassed the full diversity of government.
At the same time, I think that it is arguable that business and
government executive jobs are growing rapidly more alike. .An analysis of
writings about executive jobs in both environments over the last 20 years,
plus a consideration of the social movements and -changes of that period as
*_;. -they-effect some commonly observed differences In the two types of jobs,
.~ convinces me that this is true. I have acted as if it'were in my intro-
ductory section, where .I review literature based on government, business,
'hospital, and educational administration in foreign as well as in American
:: settings. If- both this and the previous factor are relevant, than there
.:: should be a fair amount: of generality to the major conclusions of this paper.
-.Each of the questions raised here deserves further attention from organization
...theorists and students of- management .. · :: 
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